In this paper it is argued that subjective well-being of the individual depends on two types of variables. The first type consists of characteristics of the individual himself, such as age, health, income, etc. The second type of variables consists of the characteristics of the individuals belonging to his reference group. The vast literature about happiness, quality of life, and well-being informs us extensively about the effects of objective variables. How the second type affects well-being is much less investigated. It is argued that the concept of wellbeing inequality cannot be properly defined without taking the referencing process into account. The reference effect depends on how frequently individuals compare with others and on the degree of social transparency in society. We attempt to give a structural embedding of the idea of reference groups in SWB-models. In this paper we employ the reference-extended model for incorporating in happiness studies the concept of inequality in happiness or SWB. Finally, we plead for an extension of the present happiness paradigm by setting up a new additional agenda for empirical research in order to get quantified knowledge about the referencing process. As a first step we suggest a new question module to be included in new survey questionnaires.
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Introduction
In the body of traditional economics the role of the utility concept has been ambiguous.
On the one hand it is central in micro -economic model building to explain human choice behavior. On the other hand it is shunned, since it appeared very hard to give it an empirical content. With respect to the explanation of choice behavior this could be overcome by introducing the concept of ordinal utility. However, if we are interested in inequality, the concept of ordinal utility becomes useless, for the cornerstone of the inequality concept is the assumption that the situation of individuals can be compared, not only in terms of better and worse, but also in terms of how much better or worse. If we want to compare individual well-being between individuals, it requires a cardinal well -being 1 concept.
Notwithstanding this, the inequality concept has already a long history in economics.
Things started with measuring income inequalities. These were statistical parameters that described the distribution of observed incomes. Well-known examples are the Pareto α, the standard deviation of log -incomes or Theil's entropy measure. In terms of such measures perfect equality corresponds with a value zero. Atkinson (1970) was one of the first who devised an inequality measure that was more than a statistical measure. Although he never stated this explicitly, he proposed in fact that the relevant measure to gauge social inequality is not the inequality of incomes but the inequality of individual well -being. This inequality measure was based on a social welfare function (SWF) where minimum inequality corresponds with the situation where the social welfare function is maximized and due to concavity everybody enjoys an equal amount of utility or well -being. Atkinson suggested that this measure did not involve a Version January 11, 2010
cardinal utility concept, but this is debatable. Taking averages over utility implies a cardinality concept. The weakness of the approach was that there was no empirical foundation for the specification of the underlying utility function of income.
At about the same time the present author (1971) argued that by means of a subjective questioning technique one could define and estimate a cardinal welfare function of income, which later on became a key concept of the Leiden School and which can be seen as a forerunner of modern happiness economics estimation methods. By combining empirically estimated well -being with theoretical inequality indexes, the theoretical inequality concept could be empirically filled. A first example was how Atkinson's index was empirically implemented in Van Praag (1977) (see also Van Praag and Ferrer-iCarbonell (2004, ch. 13) ).
Apart from the cardinality issue there is a potential second problem with well-being inequality measures in general. income inequality measures are explicitly or implicitly based on a transferable utility concept. Indeed, income can be redistributed. There are however more well-being determinants than income (e.g. health, age, education, and IQ).
Most of these determinants cannot be redistributed but they are relevant for well -being, and inter-individual differences in those non-income determinants may cause feelings of well -being inequality as well. It follows that well-being inequality cannot be a simple generalization of income inequality, as feelings of inequality in well -being may be caused by many factors, only one of which is income. We do not have a simple ideal benchmark of what is minimal inequality either. Theoretically, this has to be equality of individual well -being, but this concept is empty, as long as we do not accept an empirical individual well -being concept .
Nowadays the results of happiness economics have led to a beginning acceptance of the possibility to estimate subjective well-being directly by means of evaluation questions of the type :
how do you evaluate your life as a whole on a scale from 0 to 10, where zero stands for the worst and 10 for the best situation.?
We refer to Frey and Stutzer (2002) , Layard (2005) , Van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2003 , 2008 , Clark, Frijters, and Shields (2008) , Dolan et al. (2008 ), Graham (2008 for surveys of the blooming literature.
In this paper we shall argue that the present model used in happiness literature is essentially incomplete. The present literature 2 is in essence about empirically estimating the equation , where x stands for a vector of characteristics of the individual x.
In relatively few contributions the impact of the reference group of the individual is recognized. This is done by including the average income In Section 2 we shall discuss the operational concept of subjective well-being. In Section 3 we shall develop the corresponding well-being inequality concept. In section 4 we shall take account of the fact that no individual evaluates in isolation, but that the circumstances of his reference group co-determine his norms on what is subjective wellbeing. It follows that the phenomenon of social transparency or lack of transparency plays a role in the evaluation of social subjective well-being. This calls for developing a model of the referencing process and the definition of a personal subjective inequality concept, which describes the inequality the individual perceives between his satisfaction level and the satisfaction levels of others in his reference group. In Section 5 we aggregate those feelings of personal inequality into a social subjective inequality concept.
The aim of this paper is to sketch a theoretical model of how the reference mechanism affects individual well-being and, consequently, the well -being inequality concept.
Finally, we consider how these insights may contribute to the shaping of social policy. In this paper we do not give an empirical application. The reason for this is that we do not Version January 11, 2010
know of the existence of a data set that would make it possible to estimate the model. In Section 6 we discuss how these concepts might be made operational in practice.
In Section 7 we shall briefly consider the implications for social policy, while Section 8
concludes.
This paper may also be read as a plea for creating more empirical information on the referencing process by extracting information from individuals in surveys and experimental settings.
We hope that the model outlined in this paper may be a fruitful starting point for integrating the referencing mechanism in happiness economics. This is the final objective of this paper.
Version January 11, 2010 n n 2. Subjective well-being.
The concept of subjective well-being is empirically based on the so-called satisfaction questions like the one cited in the introduction. Such satisfaction questions can also be posed with respect to life domains, such as health, financial situation and job situation, yielding empirical evaluations of domain satisfaction or domain well -being. The answers to such questions are mainly categorized on a numerical scale from 0 to 10, 1 to 10, or 1 to 7. There is now a growing consensus that such answers have cardinal significance (cf. Easterlin (2006) ). Respondents have a conception of a worst and a best situation and they situate their situation between those points. At the moment nearly all empirically used question modules are categorized, such that only the points 0, 1, 2,…, and 10 are possible answers, but it does not need much fantasy to assume that in the near future those answers will be asked and given on a continuous scale by the respondent who positions himself on a continuous line segment where the left end -point stands for the evaluation of the worst conceivable situation and the right end -point for the best conceivable situation. Let the situation itself be described by some characteristics like 'income', 'health status' , ' age ', in short a vector x, then the evaluation of x is described by a number . We will call such a function a satisfaction function ( ) U x 3 .
The most simple approach is now to denote the responses on the satisfaction question by These satisfaction functions are subjective and individualized. They are subjective, because they are derived from gauging subjective feelings. They are individualized because individual variables determine life satisfaction.
Subjective inequality
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Up to now there are only a few attempts to define inequality with respect to happiness or subjective well -being 4 (SWB) (Ferrer-i-Carbonell, Van Praag (2003) , Van Praag, Ferrer -i-Carbonell ( 2004 and 2008) ). Nevertheless, the same need for income inequality definitions that has produced such a flourishing literature in economics is now even more strongly felt with respect to the concept of happiness or satisfaction inequality. If we are looking for a definition of subjective inequality it should be based on these measured subjective satisfaction functions
Here, the basic ingredient is the observed response U and one of the corresponding happiness equations (2.1), (2,2) and (2.3). If all individuals in our sample would enjoy the same SWB -level U, it would imply that SWB -inequality is minimal. This situation may occur even if the SWB -determinants income, age and family size are different between individuals. The only thing that counts is that their corresponding U -values according to (2.3) are identical. The individuals have to be on the same indifference curve. The advantage of this definition on the basis of subjective, individually specified, satisfaction functions is that satisfaction or well -being is not only determined by income but by many other determinants as well, such as age, number of children, and health. For instance, there is strong evidence that the age and health of the individual are determinants of life satisfaction. It follows then that part of the observed inequality in well-being may be explained by differences in age and health. If individuals have the same U (or u) -value, they enjoy the same level of subjective well -being. Moreover, the individualization implies that different individuals may evaluate the same objective situation (e.g. characterized by income) differently, depending on personal characteristics such as age and health. Now we may define inequality with respect to SWB in a similar manner as it has been defined with respect to income. That is any income inequality index , The u-variable takes over the role of (log-)income.
Surely, definition of a SWB-inequality index implies accepting the cardinal significance of U , as the measurement of inequality implies giving a meaning to the difference between various levels of SWB. Consequently, if we do not believe in a cardinal significance of the responses to satisfaction or happiness questions, then it is impossible to define an SWB -inequality index, irrespective of the specific definition of that inequality index
. This is true, notwithstanding the fact that under an ordinal interpretation complete equality may be identified as the situation, where all individuals assign an equal satisfaction value U to their situation.
In this paper we choose for a rather simple and intuitive definition of SWB-inequality.
We specify inequality by the variance (or standard deviation) of u over the sample or population. As already said, we may also use any other usual income inequality measure like the Gini -index, the Theil -index, Pareto -or the Atkinson -index. However, in this context, where we aim at introducing the reference group effect within an inequality context, we take the inequality definition which is most convenient for the exposition. The first approach according to which we might define subjective well-being inequality with respect to a specific population is
Here the variance is taken with respect to the population density ( ) f x of the vector of relevant characteristics x, and xx Σ is the population covariance matrix of the vector x of welfare determinants. The log-income variance is one of its diagonal elements. If SWB is only dependent on log -income, it is obvious that SWB -inequality is just 2 2 (log( )) y
If we assume the implicit classical assumption that SWB equals log -income, then β = 1, and we end up with the traditional variance of log -incomes.
We see here two points to be noticed. First, the vector β makes the variance subjective.
The vector β is assessed on the basis of subjective questions on how satisfied individuals are. Differences with respect to variables that correspond to a relatively large β and consequently have a sizeable impact on individual well -being will have a strong influence on overall variance, while variables with a relatively small β will have a small effect on overall variance as well. If income is included as one of the variables x, then income inequality is one of the components of SWB -inequality, but inequality in other variables have influence on u or well-being U as well. Second, we see that ( with respect to the relevant determinants x, that is xx Σ = O , subjective inequality will be zero as well.
If the inequality index is a political tool, then we may ask which variables x are considered as being relevant by the government. For instance, is the number of children relevant for making government policy? If we should not think so, we have to ignore the SWB -differences due to the children effect, although it is intuitively obvious that family size inequality affects life satisfaction inequality. It means that we have to re-estimate equation (3.6) without including the variable family size. If that variable is correlated with other explanatory variables, as it most probably is, it will imply that the estimate of the vector β will change as well. This shows that the choice of explanatory variables is rather relevant for the definition and the measurement of subjective inequality, and this makes the choice of which variables are considered to be relevant for including in the inequality definition a political matter as such.
4. Personal subjective inequality as felt by individuals within reference groups.
The inequality index just considered does not take into account the reference phenomenon. Does this index account properly for the impact of the refereeing process on the feelings of inequality of individual citizens? Probably it does not. The reason is that the evaluation by individuals of their own situation is partly done by comparing their own situation with that of others, the so-called reference group. The effect of own income is positive. The age effect is regularly found to be parabolic, first decreasing and after about 40 increasing (see. e.g. Blanchflower and Oswald, 2004, Plug and Van Praag (1995); Wunder et al. (2009) even distinguish a cubic age curve). For reasons of exposition we ignore the squared term. The effect of children on life satisfaction is ambiguous. The effect of reference income is mainly estimated to be negative, that is, own satisfaction reduces if neighbors get more, although some authors like Senik (2004) found a positive effect, e.g., for ex-Soviet citizens.
Actually, the problem is how to describe the reference group. Mostly this is intuitively defined by assumption. The reference group is equated to persons belonging to the same age bracket, education group, region, etc. However, this a priori definition discards the Version January 11, 2010 possibility that we can learn from the data what the composition of the reference group really is.
In order to get a more detailed description of the reference group and its influence we need to look more in detail. We shall outline the idea by a simple example. Then we may write (4.1) more explicitly as compare their situation with others only for a fraction (1-π) of their time while for a fraction π they look only at their own situation without comparing. We call the fraction π the self-orientation coefficient of the individual. Its complement (1-π) may be termed the outwards -orientation coefficient. It follows that we assume that satisfaction u P is not constant for an individual but that it depends on his or her mood of the moment ,whether he or she is comparing or non -comparing his situation with that of others. In short, we assume that P u is a random variable, defined as 0 0 with chance ( ) with chance (1-)
Life satisfaction, even during a relatively short period, is not constant but it is random, depending on whom one is comparing to at the moment. We might call it instantaneous satisfaction. The corresponding cardinal value on [0,1] is found by means of (2.2).
In the first situation in (4.3) Peter looks only at his own situation, he is self-oriented. In the second situation it is only the difference between him and John that counts. Notice Version January 11, 2010 that in this simple specification even if Peter and John are in the same situation, this does not imply that the individual 's P u is the same in both situations. Just the fact that both are felt to be in the same situation as such may make Peter feel less happy or more happy.
It is evident that this specification is just an example.
We notice that the expectation ( ) P E u , like in (4.2), is a linear function in P X and J X 0 0 ( ) .
(1 ) .
(1 ) ( )
If the true model is (4.4), where is a random variable depending on whether we compare or not at the moment, we are in fact estimating its expectation (4.1).
, n ref y
We notice that the parameter π is unknown and has to be estimated as well. We cannot empirically identify β without further information with respect to the comparison chance.
Perhaps, the Day Reconstruction Method, as described by Kahneman et al. (2004) , can
shed light on what is the frequency of comparison moments. Now we may also define a feeling of personal well -being inequality as felt by Peter. It is (4.5)
(1 )[ ( )] x . We have here a random choice process in two stages. The first choice determines whether the individual is in a comparing or a non-comparing mood, chances being (1-π ) and π , respectively. Second, the question is which specific reference type is coming into n's mind, when he is actually comparing. This is described by the reference density function In accordance with the definition in (4.5) in the case of a multi-person reference group we now define the feeling of personal subjective inequality from the viewpoint of individual n as
This formula is based on the well -known variance decomposition formula. There are now two 'subgroups' distinguished. The first is the one -person group consisting of the individual n himself, while the second subgroup is his or her reference group, consisting of many different social types. Hence, there is a 'between' -inequality described by the first term in (4.8) and a 'within' -inequality of the reference group itself, given by the second term.
Personal subjective inequality appears to depend on four elements. First, it depends on the self-orientation coefficient π; second, it depends on the perceived difference between the individual and his or her reference group; third, on the vector γ, that is, on the effects Version January 11, 2010
γ of the reference vector elements on satisfaction. Some components have strong influence like reference income, while others presumably will have negligible influence;
fourth, it depends on the spread within the reference group, that is, the covariance matrix . It describes in a sense the individual's horizon of society as perceived by individual n. If one diagonal element, say corresponding to reference income, is larger than another, say, with respect to reference age, it means that the reference group of n is wider with respect to income than with respect to age. We notice that all parameters seem to be estimable, when we are able to get more specific observations on the individual reference process. We need answers to the question how frequently an individual compares his own situation with that of others , yielding a π -estimate and we need to know with whom the individual compares to get an idea of the reference density function , ( ) 
Now it is tempting to assume the distribution to be normal, which may be realized after suitable redefinition of the variables. For example, taking logs frequently helps a good deal. Still better is to apply an integral transformation where quantiles of the empirical distribution function are mapped on the corresponding quantiles of the standard normal Version January 11, 2010 distribution function. Again, we observe that choosing for normality after suitable transformation of the observations does not imply that the model cannot be generalized to non-normal distributions. However, for the sake of exposition we assume normality. In fact, whether a normal specification is realistic, has to be inferred from empirical observation. It follows that subjective inequality does not only depend on the inequality with respect to own welfare determinants, but that it also depends on the individual reference effects and on the inequality in the reference group.
In the above we made the convenient assumption that the underlying distribution of would be multivariate normal. Although not unreasonable as a first approximation, it is not really needed. The conceptual model just described holds for any distribution, but only the formulae become less elegant or have to be replaced by numerical calculations. A first inspiration content-wise is given by a recent paper by Clark and Senik (2008) who analyzed two questions put in Wave 3 of the European Social Survey (ESS Obviously, there are some objective characteristics X like e.g. income, education, and health which may be influenced by government, although not without a cost attached. A change in the parameters β will be rather difficult as they describe real preferences. The same holds more or less for the parameters γ. They stand for the jealousy effects, which and there holds the larger the transparency, the greater personal inequality feelings will be.
We may write (7.1) more explicitly as
The second term may be written more explicitly by substituting (5.5). From this formula (7.2) it is clear that the parameters of the referencing mechanism play an important role in the perception of the SWF. As we saw already, the reference distribution is a description of how visible other people are for a citizen. The covariance matrix describes the social transparency of society with respect to a number of relevant dimensions, described by the dimensions of X.
It is obvious that the referencing process is a sociological phenomenon, which can be influenced. We think here especially of media policy. For instance, when television disseminates on a day to day basis how the rich are living it is obvious that the frequency of comparing and social transparency is increased enormously. In formula it would imply The same holds on a global level for global inequality feelings. Hence, governments, and to a lesser extent publications in radio and printed journals and newspapers, have a nonnegligible and perhaps even enormous effect on the referencing mechanism. Although it is fashionable to welcome more social transparency, it is a matter to be discussed whether this tendency is good from a standpoint of social well-being. The model outlined above suggests that there are risks involved.
There will be costs associated with the manipulation of π , ref μ 
Conclusion.
In this paper we built a model to include the social referencing mechanism into happiness economics. We do not have the illusion that this model will be estimable in a year from now. However, as section 6 suggests, it is certainly conceivable to estimate the missing parameters of the reference mechanism by posing suitable questions.
It is well-known that comparing with reference groups affects feelings of individual subjective well -being. In this paper we argue that referencing affects inequality feelings as well. The subjective inequality concept was introduced in Van Praag, Ferrer -iCarbonell (2008) . When we are investigating inequality of subjective well-being we have to recognize that interpersonal comparisons by individuals with their reference persons must be at the basis of the inequality concept. Therefore we defined an individual's reference group as a distribution of reference persons described in terms of the same characteristics which we deem to be relevant satisfaction determinants for the individual himself.
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If we assume that the individual's well-being is partly determined by comparison with his reference group, the same will hold for his perception of the inequality of well being; in fact, it is the well -being inequality within his reference group plus the inequality between the individual and his reference group as a whole.
Then we make a distinction between the individual's SWB -inequality as perceived by individuals and social SWB -inequality, which is an average of the individual subjective well -being inequality perceptions.
If we assume that social well being, as described by a social welfare function, depends on individual subjective well -being and on the individual's perception of SWBinequality, it follows that that the reference mechanism as such may have effect on the social welfare function. If a government accepts the task of increasing SWB, it may see influencing the social reference mechanism as a legitimate policy instrument.
The present paper is a first and necessarily mainly theoretical exercise on this line. At the moment we do not know of available data to operationalize our model empirically.
However, we outline how, as an extension of existing questionnaires , we may add new questions by means of which it becomes empirically possible to estimate the parameters of the referencing mechanism in practice. If such data are realized, the way lies open for an empirical operationalization of this model.
We hope by this paper to have drawn more attention to the probably important role of the referencing mechanism for the implementation of social policy.
